Churchill defended his actions in Yalta during a three-day parliamentary debate beginning on February 27, which ended with a vote of confidence. During the debate, many MEPs criticised Churchill and expressed deep reservations about Yalta and their support for Poland, with 25 of them drafting an amendment protesting against the agreement. [22] The Memorandum of Understanding invited the signatories to “jointly discuss the measures necessary to fulfill the shared responsibility set out in this Declaration.” During the discussions in Yalta, Molotov inserted language that weakened the implications of executing the declaration. [19] I therefore recommend that we remain firm in the interpretation of the Yalta Agreement as set out above. Davidson, Robert Harold, “The Far Eastern Accords of the Yalta Conference of February 4 and 11, 1945 and the Sino-Soviet Agreements of August 1945” (1969). Dissertations and theses. Document 700 doi.org/10.15760/etd.700 This document will present a study of the Far Eastern Treaties of the Yalta Conference, held from 4 to 11 February 1945, and will follow them until their conclusion in the agreements signed by the Soviet Union and Nationalist China in August of the same year. These war treaties between the Soviet Union and the United States, signed by Britain and later by Nationalist China, reflected the distributions of power that existed at the time. The Far East Agreements concluded by the United States were concluded in the national interest of the United States for reasons deemed necessary at the time. Most of the information in this document comes from U.S. government documents and first-hand reports from men who have attended or watched meetings and conferences dealing with the topics discussed. The Reed College Document Library provided most of the material, with additional materials purchased from the Portland State University Library and the Multnomah County Library.
All other information was obtained upon request from Portland State University Library offices at various libraries in the Pacific Northwest. Context and history of problems are presented to give the reader the right perspective before the problems are discussed. The strategic positions and conditions of the Second World War, before and after the Yalta Conference, are presented to provide the reader with a better knowledge of the conditions surrounding the topics discussed. The actual negotiations on the Far East agreements and the Sino-Soviet agreements are discussed in more detail. Some of the concessions on China agreed by the United States at the Yalta Conference were deemed necessary at the time. Although it is known that these concessions were made at the expense of China, the conclusions drawn in this document will show that the Far East agreements were a compromise of the continued viability of the great powers until the final defeat of Japan, and not a compromise of principles on the part of the United States. as many historians and critics have assumed. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, after the Chinese Communists took the dominant position in China, these agreements were violently attacked and criticized by many sources, including a Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. This article will show that much of the criticism and many of the criticisms were completely unjustified in their beliefs, as they failed to look at the bigger picture and benefited greatly in retrospect.
The Far East Accords were not a radical change in US policy toward China. They were not a radical change in traditional American politics. They were deemed necessary for both military and political reasons. These agreements were a carefully crafted plan to achieve three objectives: (1) to ensure Soviet participation in the Pacific War as soon as possible; (2) Establish the best possible cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist government of China; and (3) limit Soviet expansion into China and prevent China from being divided and torn apart after the war. With the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet negotiations in August 1945, it was believed that these three objectives had been achieved. It should be noted that when Stalin asked for a lease for the port of Deiiren, President Roosevelt refused to accept it, suggesting that it violated US-China policy. It is not clear from the discussions that led to the Yalta Agreement that the protection of the “best interests of the Soviet Union” should go beyond Soviet interests in the free transit of exports and imports to and from the Soviet Union. Dr. Soong`s offer of a commercial lease to the Soviet government for an exclusive use area of the port appears to adequately protect this interest. Poland was the first item on the Soviet agenda. Stalin said that “for the Soviet government, the question of Poland was a matter of honor” and security, because Poland had served as a historic corridor for forces trying to invade Russia.
[10] In addition, Stalin stated, in reference to history, that “because the Russians had sinned strongly against Poland,” “the Soviet government tried to atone for these sins.” [10] Stalin concluded that “Poland must be strong” and that “the Soviet Union is interested in creating a powerful, free and independent Poland.” As a result, Stalin stipulated that the demands of the Polish government-in-exile were non-negotiable: the Soviet Union would retain the territory of eastern Poland that it had already annexed in 1939, and Poland would be compensated for this by expanding its western borders at the expense of Germany. Contrary to his previously stated position, Stalin promised free elections in Poland, even though there was a Soviet-sponsored provisional government that had recently been installed by him in the Polish territories occupied by the Red Army. .